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Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
By Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa, and Jean-Marc Tallon1
1. introduction
When is it Pareto optimal for risk averse agents to take bets? Under what
conditions do they choose to introduce uncertainty into an otherwise certain
economic environment? One obvious case is where they do not share beliefs.
As in the classical (theoretical) example of horse lotteries, people who do
not agree on probability assessments do ¯nd it mutually bene¯cial to engage
in uncertainty-generating trade.
If the agents involved are Bayesian expected utility maximizers and
strictly risk averse, it is not hard to see that disagreement on probabili-
ties is the only way that betting, understood as trade of an uncertain asset,
may be Pareto improving when starting from a full insurance allocation.
On the other hand, any such disagreement induces betting. Put di®erently,
Pareto optimality dictates either that there be no betting (in case beliefs are
common to all agents) or that there be betting (in case of disagreement).
This is somewhat puzzling, because there is no lack of allocation-neutral,
\sunspot" sources of uncertainty in the world around us. If every disagree-
ment on probabilities of states of the world suggests a Pareto improving
trade, one might have expected to see much more betting taking place.
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Rather than believing that people who do not bet necessarily share prob-
abilistic beliefs about anything they do not bet on (or, to be precise, share
these beliefs up to some slack allowed by transaction costs), we tend to
take the relative rarity of bets as a piece of empirical evidence against the
Bayesian model. It seems that often people do not bet because they are
uncertainty averse, and they therefore tend to avoid uncertainty that they
know little about. It follows that a person's willingness to bet will increase
with her subjective con¯dence in her information and in her likelihood as-
sessments. It is worth emphasizing that Bewley's (1986) motivation for
his work on Knightian decision theory was partly this absence of observed
widespread betting.
While we do not attempt to argue that the full complexity of betting
behavior can be explained by the type of models we study here,2 we are
led to ask, how much can be explained by these models if we relax some
of the more demanding assumptions of the Bayesian model. Speci¯cally,
we consider maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior (Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989)) that captures Knightian uncertainty (Knight (1921)).
Assume that such uncertainty averse agents who are also risk averse, give
rise to an economy in which there is no aggregate risk. When does there
exist full insurance, i.e., no-bet allocations that are also Pareto optimal?
When is it the case that all Pareto optimal allocations are full insurance?
Is any betting due to di®erent beliefs, and, conversely, does a di®erence in
beliefs always trigger some betting?
In the multiple prior model an individual is characterized by a utility
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function and a non-empty, closed and convex set of probability measures.
The individual evaluates every act by its expected utility according to each
possible probability measure, and chooses an act whose minimal expected
utility is the highest. The family of preference relations described by this
model strictly contains the relations described by Choquet expected utility
with a convex capacity (see Schmeidler (1989)).
Consider now a pair of agents conforming to the multiple prior model.
It is an easy extension of the expected utility analysis to show that these
agents will not bet against one another if they share at least one prior.
Moreover, in a general framework with more than two agents and complex
bets possibly involving several of them, it is easy to show, following Dow and
Werlang (1992) early intuition, that Pareto optimal allocations are indeed
full insurance allocations whenever agents' sets of priors have a non-empty
intersection (see, e.g., Tallon (1998), Dana (1998)).
The question of whether the converse to this result holds arises natu-
rally: is commonality of beliefs, in the sense of agents sharing a prior in
common, exactly what is needed to explain, within the framework of the
multiple prior model, the absence of betting on the many possible sources
of \extrinsic" uncertainty? Di®erently put, is the observation of a Pareto
optimal allocation that is immune to sunspots enough to tell us something
about the intersection of agents' sets of priors?
It turns out that we can answer this question a±rmatively and that the
result in the Bayesian model has a conceptually identical counterpart in
the multiple prior model. Under the same non-triviality conditions, there
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exists a Pareto optimal full insurance allocation if and only if all Pareto
optimal allocations provide full insurance, and this holds if and only if all
agents share a prior probability on the states of the world. In other words,
commonality of beliefs is the necessary and su±cient condition to explain
the absence of betting. Whereas in the Bayesian model \sharing a prior"
could only mean \having an identical prior," in the multiple prior model
this phrase may be read as \having at least one prior in common." With
this grammatical convention in place, the result holds verbatim.
Bayesian agents either agree on probability assessments, or disagree
enough to bet against each other. By contrast, uncertainty averse agents
can be in a \grey area" between agreeing and disagreeing: they may not
agree in the sense of having the same set of possible priors, yet not disagree
in the sense of being willing to bet against each other.
Finally, we emphasize another contribution of this note. In showing that
commonality of beliefs is the minimal assumption explaining the absence
of bets, we prove a separation theorem for n convex sets that might be of
interest on its own.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the set
up of the model. In section 3 we state the main result and the separation
theorem. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2. set-up
The economy we consider is a standard two-period pure-exchange econ-
omy with uncertainty in the second period, but for agents' preferences. The
state space is S, and § a ¾-algebra of subsets of S, so that (S;§) is a measur-
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able state space. There are n agents indexed by subscript i. We assume (i)
that there is only one good, which can be interpreted as income or money;
and (ii) that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Trading an uncertain asset is
thus interpreted as betting rather than as hedging. Let B(S;§) be the Ba-
nach space of real-valued, bounded and measurable functions on S, endowed
with the sup-norm. Let ba(S; §) be the space of bounded ¯nitely additive
measures on (S;§) endowed with the weak?-topology. Agent i's consump-
tion Ci, is a positive element of B(S; §), that is, Ci(s) is the consumption of
agent i in state s. Denote by w 2 B(S;§) the constant-across-states aggre-
gate endowment, and assume that w > 0. An allocation C = (C1; : : : ; Cn)
is feasible if
Pn
i=1Ci = w. An allocation is interior if Ci(s) > 0 for all i, for
all s.
In the multiple-prior approach, each agent i is endowed with a utility
index Ui : IR+ ! IR and a set Pi of probability distributions over S. Ui is
de¯ned up to a positive a±ne transformation, and is taken to be di®eren-
tiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Pi is a convex and closed set
of ba(S;§). We assume that all priors in Pi are ¾-additive.3 Note that Pi is
compact in the weak?-topology since it is a weak?-closed subset of the set of
¯nitely-additive probability measures on §, which is compact in the weak?-
topology (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwarz (1958)). The norm-dual of B(S; §)
which is isometrically isomorphic to ba(S;§) will be denoted B?(S;§).
The overall utility function Vi de¯ned over B(S;§) then takes the fol-
lowing form:
Vi(Ci) = min
¼2Pi
E¼Ui(Ci)
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We assume throughout that all priors are mutually absolutely continuous :
8A 2 §; 8i; j; 8¼i 2 Pi; 8¼j 2 Pj; ¼i(A) = 0 () ¼j(A) = 0
This assumption essentially says that all agents agree on \null events". It
is naturally satis¯ed if, say, the state space is ¯nite and all measures are
strictly positive, or if all measures are absolutely continuous with respect to
an underlying measure.
The last de¯nition we need is that of a full insurance allocation. An
allocation C is said to be full insurance if it is constant apart from a set
A 2 § that has ¼i(A) = 0 for some (and therefore, by the assumption of
mutual absolute continuity, for all) ¼i 2 Pi and i.4
3. the main result
The following theorem states that the set of Pareto optimal allocations
and the set of full insurance allocations are either identical or disjoint. More-
over, they are identical if and only if the agents share at least one prior.
Theorem 1 Under the maintained assumptions, the following assertions
are equivalent:
(i) There exists an interior full insurance Pareto optimal allocation.
(ii) Any Pareto optimal allocation is a full insurance allocation.
(iii) Every full insurance allocation is Pareto optimal.
(iv)
Tn
i=1 Pi 6= ;
The intuition for the proof (and the role of some assumptions) is as
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follows. We prove that (iv) ) (ii) ) (iii) ) (i) ) (iv). If there is a
common prior (iv), one can use strict concavity to show that a risk bearing
allocation is Pareto dominated by the full insurance allocation that equals
its expectation at every state, proving (ii).5 This step uses the mutual ab-
solute continuity assumption, as well as the assumption that the probability
measures we deal with are ¾-additive (rather than only ¯nitely additive).
Observe that with ¯nitely additive measures the implication (iv) ) (ii)
does not hold, even in a Bayesian set-up. This is so because the integral
of a function with respect to a ¯nitely additive measure may be strictly
smaller than each of the values the function assumes. Therefore individuals
who hold assets that they view as uncertain may not bene¯t from smooth-
ing them across states. If every Pareto improving allocation provides full
insurance (ii), the converse (iii) also holds, since no two full insurance allo-
cations can be Pareto ranked,6 and it follows trivially that there is at least
one such allocation (i). Finally, the crucial step and the main contribution
of the theorem is that the existence of a full insurance Pareto optimal al-
location (i) implies that there is a common prior (iv). This step does not
require concavity of the utility index:7 In proving this last part we make
use of the following theorem, which generalizes the standard separating hy-
perplane theorem, and may be of interest on its own. In the appendix we
also comment on the geometric interpretation of this result which may be
viewed as a separation theorem among n convex sets.
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Theorem 2 Let X be a locally convex linear topological space and let
Pi µ X, 1  i  n, be convex, non-empty, and compact. Then, the following
are equivalent:
(i)
Tn
i=1Pi = ;
(ii) There exist I µ f1; : : : ; ng, I 6= ; and p 2 co ([i2IPi) and for each
i 2 I, there exists a continuous linear functional hi : X ! IR such that:
(a) 8 i 2 I, hi(q ¡ p) > 0 for all q 2 Pi
(b)
P
i2I hi = 0
An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is that, under the same assump-
tion, if
Tn
i=1Pi = ;, there exist continuous linear functionals hi, i = 1; : : : ; n
and a point p such that (a') hi(q ¡ p) ¸ 0 for all q 2 Pi, for all i, (b')Pn
i=1 hi = 0, and (c') there exist i, i
0 such that the inequality in (a') is
strict.
It is worthy of note that a similar result, developed independently and
with a rather di®erent motivation, is to be found in Samet (1998), for subsets
of a ¯nite dimensional simplex. Samet's result is weaker in the sense that
it guarantees the existence of linear functionals as in our case, but does not
guarantee that the separating hyperplanes will intersect at one point p in the
convex hull of the sets, and therefore does not yield itself to a straightforward
geometric interpretation. Further, Samet's result can be easily derived from
the corollary above specialized to subsets of the simplex. It does not appear
that Samet's argument could easily be amended to get ours.
Theorem 1 has two immediate corollaries. First, in the Choquet expected
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utility model with convex capacities, non-empty core intersection is equiva-
lent to some, or all, Pareto optimal allocations being full insurance. Second,
in the expected utility case, where the sets of priors are reduced to one point,
some, or all, Pareto optimal allocations are full insurance allocations if and
only if agents have the same beliefs (i.e., the same prior).
Note that even though we cast the argument in the multiple prior model,
it should be clear from the proof that a similar result holds for Bewley
(1986) approach. In Bewley's approach, agents are also endowed with a set
of priors and move away from a (exogenously de¯ned) status quo situation
only if the new situation is better than the status quo for all the probability
distributions in their set of priors. While Bewley characterizes a partial
order over acts, a proposed bet will be preferred to a certain status quo if
and only if this preference holds in the multiple prior model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler.8
Our analysis is conducted for an economy with one good. However, the
only use we make of this assumption is in arguing that all full insurance
allocations are Pareto optimal. Indeed, one can generalize our results to
an economy with m goods, with the slight modi¯cation that full insurance
allocations that are considered for optimality be assumed Pareto optimal in
each state.
CERAS-ENPC and Universit¶e Paris II, 92, rue d'Assas, 75006 Paris, France.
E-mail: billot@u-paris2.fr
and
9
CERMSEM, Universit¶e Paris I, 106-112, bld de l'Ho^pital, 75647 Paris Cedex
13, France. E-mail: chateaun@univ-paris1.fr
and
Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Recanati School of Business, Tel-
Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel and Dept of Economics, Boston Uni-
versity, 270 Bay State Rd, Boston, MA, 02215, U.S.A. E-mail: gilboa@econ.tau.ac.il
and
CNRS{EUREQua, 106-112, bld de l'Ho^pital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
E-mail: jmtallon@univ-paris1.fr
10
appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
We ¯rst prove (iv) ) (ii) Assume to the contrary that there exists
an agent, say, agent 1, such that for every ¼1 2 P1 and every c 2 IR+,
¼1 (fs jC1(s) < cg) + ¼1 (fs jC1(s)g > cg) > 0.
Let ¼ 2 \iPi and de¯ne ¹Ci = E¼Ci for all i. Abusing notation, let ¹Ci also
denote the constant allocation giving ¹Ci to agent i in all states. ¹C = ( ¹Ci)i
is a feasible allocation since
P
i
¹Ci =
P
iE¼Ci = E¼ (
P
iCi) = E¼w1S = w.
Now,
Vi(Ci) = min
'2Pi
E'Ui(Ci)  E¼Ui(Ci)
Furthermore,
E¼Ui(Ci)  Ui(E¼(Ci)) = Ui( ¹Ci) = Vi( ¹Ci)
for all i since Ui is concave.
Since ¼ belongs to Pi, one gets that
¼
¡fs jC1(s) < ¹C1g¢ + ¼ ¡fs jC1(s) > ¹C1g¢ > 0
Furthermore, ¼
¡fs jC1(s) < ¹C1g¢ = 0 is impossible, for then, ¼ ¡fs jC1(s) > ¹C1g¢ >
0, implying by ¾-additivity of ¼ that E¼(C1) > ¹C1, a contradiction. Hence,
¼
¡fs jC1(s) < ¹C1g¢ > 0 and, similarly, ¼ ¡fs jC1(s) > ¹C1g¢ > 0.
It follows that V1(C1) < V1( ¹C1) since U1 is strictly concave. Therefore,
the allocation ¹C Pareto dominates C, a contradiction.
To see that (ii) implies (iii), let C be a full insurance allocation. Assume,
contrary to (iii), that it is not Pareto optimal, and is dominated by another
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allocation C0. By the same argument as above, ¹C0 is at least as desirable
as C0 for every agent. By transitivity of Pareto domination, ¹C0 Pareto
dominates C. But this is a contradiction since both provide full insurance
and there is only one good in the economy.
That (iii) implies (i) is obvious, and it remains to prove that (i) implies
(iv). Suppose to the contrary that \iPi = ;, and let C be an interior Pareto
optimal allocation that is a full-insurance allocation (Ci is constant for all i
apart on a set of measure zero, the latter notion being de¯ned unambiguously
given our absolute mutual continuity assumption). By Theorem 2 (where X
is B?(S; §) endowed with the weak?-topology), since \iPi = ;, there exists
a non-empty set I, a point p and functionals hi 2 B?(S;§), i 2 I such that:
(a) 8i 2 I, hi(q ¡ p) > 0 for all q 2 Pi
(b)
P
i2I hi = 0
Recall that (see e.g. Kelley and Namioka (1963), p.155) every weak?-
continuous linear functional on the conjugate space of a linear topological
space E is the evaluation at some point of E. Hence, for all i 2 I, there
exists Di 2 B(S; §) such that hi(p) = p(Di), for all p 2 B?(S; §).
Construct the allocation
³ bCi´
i=1;:::;n
as follows:
bCi = Ci i =2 I
bCi = Ci + " [Di ¡ p(Di)1S ] i 2 I
with " > 0 small enough so that bC is an allocation.
We ¯rst check that this allocation is feasible :
"
"X
i2I
Di ¡
X
i2I
p(Di)1S
#
= "
"X
i2I
Di ¡
X
i2I
hi(p)
#
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= "
X
i2I
Di since
X
i2I
hi = 0
Now, Di is such that hi(q) = q(Di) for all q 2 B?(S;§) and hence
q(
P
i2I Di) = 0 for all q 2 B?(S; §).
To conclude that
P
i2I Di = 0, suppose there exists s such that
P
i2I Di(s) =
a, a 6= 0. The event fs jPi2I Di(s) = ag is measurable because the Di are
measurable. Now, let q be the continuous linear functional in B?(S; §)
corresponding to the additive probability in ba(S;§) with the mass 1 on
that event. Then q(
P
i2I Di) = 0 implies a = 0, a contradiction. Hence,P
i2I Di = 0.
Now, for i 2 I, one has:
Vi( bCi) = Eq^"Ui(Ci + "[Di ¡ p(Di)1S]) for some q^" 2 Pi
= Vi(Ci) + "U
0
i(Ci)[q^
"(Di) ¡ p(Di)] + o(")
= Vi(Ci) + "U
0
i(Ci)[hi(q^
" ¡ p)] + o(")
¸ Vi(Ci) + "U 0i(Ci)[ inf
q2Pi
hi(q ¡ p) + ®(")]
where ®(") = o(")" ! 0 as " ! 0.
Since infq2Pi hi(q ¡ p) > 0 by continuity of hi and compactness of Pi, and
®(") ! 0, there exists " small enough so that the term in bracket is strictly
positive.
Hence, Vi
³ bCi´ > Vi (Ci) for i 2 I, and we found a Pareto dominating
allocation
³ bCi´
i=1;:::;n
, a contradiction. Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 2: We start with the following lemma:
Lemma: Let X be a locally convex linear topological space and let Pi µ X,
1  i  n be convex, non-empty, and compact. Assume that \inPi = ;
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but that for all `  n, \i6=`Pi 6= ;. Then, there exist p 2 co ([ni=1Pi) and a
continuous linear functional hi : X ! IR for each i  n such that:
(a) 8 i  n, hi(q ¡ p) > 0 8q 2 Pi
(b)
P
in hi = 0
The geometric interpretation of this lemma is as follows. Assume that n
convex and compact sets have an empty intersection, but that every subset
of them has a non-empty intersection. Then, we can ¯nd a point p which is
not included in any set, but which is \in the middle" in the following sense:
one can ¯nd, for each set Pi, a hyperplane hi that passes through p which
is in the convex hull of the union of the Pi and leaves the entire Pi on one
side, such that the normals of these hyperplanes, multiplied by appropriate
positive constants, add up to zero. In the case n = 2, our lemma reduces
to a standard separation theorem between two disjoint sets. For n > 2, the
lemma may be considered as an n-way separation among n convex sets. See
¯gure 1 for an illustration of the case n = 3.
Please insert Figure 1 here
Proof of the lemma: The proof is by induction on n. For n = 2, we
have P1 \ P2 = ; and we use a standard separation theorem (cf Kelley
and Namioka (1963), p.119, theorem on strong separation) to conclude that
there is a continuous linear functional h : X ! IR and a number ¯ 2 IR
such that h(q) > ¯ for q 2 P1 and h(q) < ¯ for q 2 P2. Choose p such that
h(p) = ¯, and set h1 = h and h2 = ¡h. By linearity of h it is possible to
choose p 2 co (P1 [ P2).
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Assume that the lemma holds for every n0 < n. Let there be given
(Pi)ni=1. Set A = \i<nPi and B = Pn. Observe that A and B are convex,
non-empty, and compact. Furthermore, they are disjoint since \iPi = ;.
Apply the same separation theorem to conclude that there exist a continuous
linear ehn : X ! IR and ¯ 2 IR such that
ehn(q) > ¯ 8 q 2 B and ehn(q) < ¯ 8 q 2 A
Choose q0 2 X such that ehn(q0) = ¯. We shift the origin to q0. Speci¯cally,
de¯ne for each i  n, bPi = fp ¡ q0 j p 2 Pig = Pi ¡ q0. Naturally, ³ bPi´n
i=1
and their intersections inherit all relevant properties of (Pi)i. Denote bB =
B ¡ q0 = bPn and bA = A ¡ q0 = \i<n bPi and observe that ehn(q) > 0 8q 2 bB
and ehn(q) < 0 8q 2 bA. Consider X 0 = fq 2 X j ehn(q) = 0g. X 0 is a locally
convex linear topological subspace of X. Focusing on this subspace, de¯ne
bP 0i = bPi \ X 0 for i < n. Obviously, bP 0i is convex and compact for every
i < n. We argue that it is also non-empty. Indeed, bPi contains bA. On the
other hand, bPi has a non-empty intersection with bB = bPn. By convexity of
bPi and linearity of ehn, bP 0i 6= ;. Similarly, for ` < n, \i6=`;n bPi contains bA and
intersects bB and we therefore get
\i6=`;n bP 0i 6= ; 8 ` < n
However, X 0 is an hyperplane separating bB from bA. Hence \i<n bP 0i = ;.
It follows that
³ bP 0i´i<n on X 0 satisfy the conditions of the lemma for n0 =
n ¡ 1. Therefore, there exist a point bp 2 co³[n¡1i=1 bP 0i´ and continuous linear
functionals h0i : X 0 ! IR, i < n, such that h0i(q ¡ bp) > 0 8q 2 bP 0i; i < n,
and
P
i<n h
0
i = 0 on X
0. Using standard arguments (see Fact 1 below), we
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conclude that, for every i < n, h0i on X 0 can be extended to hi on all of X
such that:
hi(q ¡ bp) > 0 8q 2 bPi
De¯ne h =
P
i<n hi on X. Observe that for every q 2 X 0,
h(q) =
X
i<n
hi(q) =
X
i<n
h0i(q) = 0
Hence ehn and h are continuous linear functionals on X satisfying:
ehn(q) = 0 ) h(q) = 0 8q 2 X
By standard arguments (see Fact 2 below), there exists ® 2 IR such that
h(q) = ®ehn(q) 8 q 2 X.
We wish to show that ® < 0. Consider q 2 bA = \i<n bPi. Since hi(q¡bp) >
0 8 i < n and h(bp) = 0, we obtain
h(q) = h(q ¡ bp) = X
i<n
hi(q ¡ bp) > 0
On the other hand, ehn(q) < 0 since q 2 bA. It follows that ® < 0.
De¯ne hn = (¡®)ehn. Since (¡®) > 0, hn(q ¡ bp) = hn(q) > 0 8 q 2 bPn.
To conclude, set p = bp + q0. Observe that p 2 co³[n¡1i=1 Pi´ and hence
p 2 co ([ni=1Pi). We claim that p and (hi)in satisfy (a) and (b). Indeed,
for every i  n, and every q 2 Pi:
hi(q ¡ p) = hi
³
(q ¡ q0) ¡ (p ¡ q0)
´
= hi
³
(q ¡ q0) ¡ bp´ > 0
since q ¡ q0 2 bPi. Finally, Pin hi = 0 by construction of hn. Q:E:D:
The following two facts, which are used in the proof above, are straight-
forward and/or well-known.
16
Fact 1: Let X be a locally convex linear topological space. Let bh be a
continuous linear functional and X 0 = fp 2 X j bh(p) = 0g. Assume that
C µ X is convex and compact, and that C \ X 0 6= ;. Further assume
that h0 : X 0 ! IR is a continuous linear functional such that h0(p) > 0
8 p 2 C \ X 0. Then, h0 can be extended to a continuous linear functional
h : X ! IR such that h(p) > 0 8 p 2 C.
Proof of Fact 1: Set D = fp 2 X 0 j h0(p) = 0g. Observe that D 6= ; since
the origin is in D. Thus C and D are disjoint non-empty closed and convex
sets in X, and C is compact. Let a continuous linear functional eh : X ! IR
and d 2 IR be such that:
eh(p) < d 8 p 2 D and eh(p) > d 8p 2 C
We claim that eh has to be constant on D. Indeed, assume that for some
p; q 2 D, eh(p) 6= eh(q). Since p; q 2 D implies bh(p) = bh(q) = 0 and h0(p) =
h0(q) = 0, we conclude that p + ®(q ¡ p) 2 D for all ® 2 IR. Hence
feh(p + ®(q ¡ p)) j ® 2 IRg = IR, a contradiction to the fact that eh(p) < d
8 p 2 D. Thus there is a c 2 IR such that eh(p) = c 8 p 2 D. Since the origin
is in D, we obtain c = 0. It follows that d > 0 and therefore
eh(p) > d > 0 8 p 2 C
We now wish to show that, up to multiplication by a positive constant, eh
extends h0 on X. Restrict attention to X 0. If p 2 X 0 satis¯es h0(p) = 0, then
p 2 D and we know that eh(p) = 0. By Fact 2 below, there exists ® 2 IR
such that eh(p) = ®h0(p) 8 p 2 X 0. However, on C \ X 0, both eh and h0 are
positive. Therefore ® > 0. Hence h ´ 1®eh extends h0 on X and is positive
17
on all of C. Q:E:D:
Fact 2: Let X be a linear space and let eh; h : X ! IR be linear. Assume
that
eh(q) = 0 ) h(q) = 0 8 q 2 X
Then there exists ® 2 IR such that h(q) = ®eh(q) 8 q 2 X
We skip the proof of this Fact and now turn to the proof of Theorem 2:
(i) ) (ii). Assume that \inPi = ;. Let I be a minimal (with respect to
set inclusion) subset of f1; : : : ; ng with the property that \i2IPi = ;. Since
\ni=1Pi = ;, but Pi 6= ; for every i, such a set I exists and for every such
set jI j¸ 2. Apply the Lemma to I.
(ii) ) (i). Assume that a point p 2 X, a set I½f1; : : : ; ng and functionals
(hi)i2I exist as required, and suppose, contrary to (i), that there exists
q 2 \inPi. Then, by (a), Pi2I hi(q ¡ p) > 0, contrary to (b). Q:E:D:
18
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Footnotes
1. We thank participants of the Erasmus conference at Tilburg Univer-
sity and two referees for useful comments.
2. In particular, we ignore the social aspects of betting as well as the
strategic ones (see, e.g., Milgrom and Stokey (1982)).
3. Note that the axiomatization of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) delivers
only ¯nitely additive probability distributions.
4. It is straightforward to check that C is of full-insurance if and only if
8i; Ci is constant apart from a set Ai 2 § that has ¼i(Ai) = 0 for some (and
therefore, by assumption of mutual absolute continuity, for all) ¼i 2 Pi.
5. This implication follows the logic of similar results for Choquet ex-
pected utility in Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (1998).
6. The fact that (iv) implies (ii) and (iii) also appears in Dana (1998)
but in a ¯nite set-up.
7. Dana (1998) shows that if there is a full insurance competitive equi-
librium in this economy with ¯nitely many states, then agents share a prior
in common. Her proof, however, uses the concavity of the utility index and
relies on the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
21
8. Bewley (1989) contains a similar no-trade result for agents whose
preferences are given by partial orders as in Bewley (1986). His proof is
very similar to Samet's, and his result is weaker than Theorem 2 in the
same sense that Samet's is.
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Figure 1-Separation among three convex sets.
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